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Preventing Unplanned Explosions
at Munitions Sites
Unplanned explosions at munitions sites (UEMS) frequently result in contamination and destruction
similar to that resulting from conflict. Preventive measures can reduce the risk of UEMS and are significantly easier to deploy than clearance after an explosion.

by Chris Loughran and Daan Redelinghuys [ MAG ]

I

nternational concern over unplanned explosions at munitions
sites (UEMS) has grown consid-

erably in recent years. UEMS have garnered significant media attention as a
result of the large number of civilians
killed or injured by these explosions.
Efforts by states, the U.N., international and nongovernmental organizations
(NGO), and research institutes have
focused on the scale and nature of the
problem while developing initiatives to
prevent unplanned explosions.
Tragically, unplanned explosions often occur in populated areas. For example, fire at a munitions site in northern
Lagos, Nigeria, caused an explosion in
2002, killing more than 1,000 civilians.1
In July 2011, a similar munitions explosion destroyed the largest power plant
in Cyprus.1 In 2012, the series of explosions that occurred at a military site in
the center of Brazzaville, Republic of the

Munitions stored at this tank regiment barracks in Brazzaville, ROC, exploded on
4 March 2012, killing 223 people and injuring 2,500.

Congo (ROC), was one of the largest in-
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cidents in recent years. Immediately following the explosion, global attention

find survivors and bodies in the rubble

focused on the enormous human and

of collapsed buildings, all shown on in-

economic impact of UEMS.1

ternational media and the Internet.

The Small Arms Survey found 302
instances of unplanned explosions in

2

Consequences of UEMS

76 countries between January 1998 and

Recognition is growing of the long-

October 2011.2 As a result of such explo-

term social and economic consequences

sions, communities are rendered home-

of UEMS, which are typically less vis-

less, and rescue workers fight fires and

ible but extend far beyond the imme-

focus | the journal of ERW and mine action | spring 2013 | 17.1

diate loss of life and the financial costs
associated with emergency response.
The closure of industrial sites, businesses and trading centers has long-term
consequences for business owners and
employees. Hospitals, schools and municipal facilities in the blast radius may
remain closed for weeks or even years.
Government budgets invariably need to

Brazzaville residents camp out on the grounds of a cathedral after they were displaced by a huge explosion at an army barracks in the city.

reprioritize significant costs of reconstruction over multiple

Preventive Measures

years. For example, the Brazzaville explosion destroyed hun-

While the availability of expert clearance, risk education

dreds of homes and businesses, leading to the temporary clo-

and coordination support after an incident is important, de-

sure of schools and a hospital. An estimated 5,000 people lost

voting the same technical expertise and resources to prevent or

their homes.

reduce the risk of such incidents is preferable. Purely in terms

From a mine action perspective, emergency response op-

of operational costs, post-explosion clearance is vastly more

erations need to incorporate explosive ordnance disposal

expensive than preventive measures to improve weapons and

(EOD) support to enable safe access for emergency respond-

ammunition management and destroy surplus munitions.

ers while also systematically identifying and destroying

The management of stockpiles is a broad and detailed sub-

unexploded ordnance (UXO). UXO can be projected a con-

ject, but the key principles relevant to the causes of UEMS

siderable distance from the explosion site and are often highly

(including the escalation of a single explosive event to a cata-

unstable. In most cases, reporting systems and risk educa-

strophic disaster like that seen in Brazzaville) are not complex.

tion in communities that have not previously experienced the

Munitions do not have an indefinite shelf life; they degrade

risks associated with contamination from UXO must accom-

over time, and storage conditions significantly impact their

pany EOD operations.

expected lifespan. Physical factors such as temperature, hu-

For the international mine action community, UEMS
occurring in countries with a limited EOD or mine action-

midity and rough handling affect shelf life, making explosives
unstable and at greater risk of not functioning as intended.

coordination capacity can trigger emergency response deploy-

While munitions are designed for continual maintenance

ments and operations usually associated with a post-conflict

throughout their life cycles in ways that maximize shelf life,

environment. In many respects, the effect of an unplanned

they also have safety parameters that minimize the effect of an

explosion is similar to the impact of conflict, including long-

explosive incident. Key safety factors include protection against

lasting, extensive damage to infrastructure.

fire and static electricity (including lightning) as well as stor-
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agement. Theft presents an additional
challenge for countries emerging from
protracted conflict.4
Technical Assistance

MAG (Mines Advisory Group) provides a range of technical assistance to
states, including Burundi, Libya, ROC,
and South Sudan, seeking to prevent
UEMS. Assistance typically takes the
form of storage-facility assessments and
training-needs assessments for munitions-storage managers and supervising
officers. Assessments also identify surplus and obsolete stocks, inform subExtensive damage was caused to residential areas of Brazzaville when munitions
at an army barracks blew up.

age in “compatibility groups,” with in-

nent stockpiles may result in an initial

compatible items (due to their chemical

explosion leading to multiple explo-

composition or explosive effect) stored

sions, as was seen in the Brazzaville in-

separately within a storage site.

cident. Reducing UEMS risk therefore

Safety measures include what is con-

requires steps to improve the condi-

sidered a safe distance for civilians rel-

tions under which munitions are stored

ative to storage locations. These limits

and how munitions are managed. This

reduce the risk of a single explosive in-

also involves the routine destruction of

cident propagating through the storage

obsolete or degraded munitions.

area and initiating further explosions

Many states have developed de-

that result in large-scale incidents. Fre-

tailed standards and procedures to en-

quently, controls over construction and

sure the safe storage and management

development in close proximity to mu-

of military-held munitions. Since their

nitions sites are not implemented, and

launch in 2011, the International Am-

urbanization dangerously encroaches

munition Technical Guidelines (IATG)

on depots. This should require a reduc-

have provided a normative framework

tion in facilities’ storage quantity or the

to improve munitions management. 3

relocation of facilities to a new site. In

IATGs also offer solutions to prevent

many cases, particularly in countries

UEMS and diversion of munitions

with poor infrastructure, capacity and

from state stocks.

resources, these essential safety measures are not carried out.

4

For many states, implementing and
managing even the most basic im-

UEMS causes range from mechani-

provements necessary to address the

cal or chemical deterioration of compo-

immediate causes of UEMS still face

nents to internal or external events such

significant challenges, including bud-

as fire and lightning, and include hu-

get constraints and competing priori-

man factors such as improper handling

ties for limited government resources.

or tampering. These causes often result

This is particularly true for countries

from inadequate site security. Poor stor-

with poor infrastructure and a lack of

age practices of temporary or perma-

technical expertise in munitions man-
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sequent training programs and lead to
the relocation or physical rehabilitation of facilities. National buy-in for the
program is essential, as is local capacity
building.
Even in the most complex operating
environments, states can implement inexpensive, effective steps, such as evaluating munitions storage procedures and
reorganizing munitions within the storage facilities, to improve the safety of
their facilities and to gain long-term
commitment from donors and greater
political support. A small degree of intervention can tangibly address the
causes of UEMS and assure security of
state stocks over time. Although initial
preventive measures may require external technical assistance and donor support, initiatives to prevent UEMS under
the broad framework of IATGs can only
be truly sustainable and effective in the
long term if they are nationally owned
and led.
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